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Muddying the waters
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in the Mazibuko case
Jackie Dugard and Sandra Liebenberg City of Johannesburg and Others v Lindiwe 
Mazibuko and Others Case No 489/08 [2009] 
ZA SCA 20 (25 March 2009)
On 25 March 2009, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) handed down judgment in 
the Mazibuko case. The case was an appeal 
against the judgment of the Johannesburg High 
Court (now the South Gauteng High Court) of 
30 April 2008, concerning the sufficiency of 
the City of Johannesburg’s free basic water 
(FBW) policy and the lawfulness of prepayment 
water meters (PPMs).
Background
In 2000, the City of Johannesburg (the City) 
experienced a fiscal crisis. From the City’s perspective, 
it became increasingly important to minimise 
inefficiencies and revenue losses in water and 
electricity supplies. One of the main areas of such 
identified inefficiencies and losses was Soweto, which 
(like most former township areas) did not have meters 
for water supply for each household. Rather, it had 
a ‘deemed consumption system’, which meant that 
each household (or property) was charged for 20 
kilolitres of water each month, regardless of actual 
consumption. A consequence of the system was that 
most households could not afford the monthly charge 
and, by 2000, Soweto households owed the City 
millions of rands for water-related services. In addition, 
Soweto’s apartheid-inherited water infrastructure 
was in a state of collapse, with inferior piping and 
numerous water leakages.
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In 2002, the City devised a plan to repair the 
water infrastructure in Soweto. It was also obliged, 
in terms of the National Free Basic Water Policy 
and the Water Services Act 108 of 1997 (section 
3 as read with section 9(1)(a) and Regulation 3(b) 
of the Regulations relating to Compulsory National 
Standards and Measures to Conserve Water, 
published in Government Gazette 22355, Notice 
R509, 8 June 2001 (National Standards Regulations)), 
to provide a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 
litres per person per day or six kiloliters per household 
per month. However, it was not possible to allocate 
the FBW under the deemed consumption system as 
individual household water supply was not metered. 
This is one of the reasons which compelled the City 
to review the deemed consumption supply system in 
Soweto. 
While other municipalities, such as eThekwini, 
replaced the deemed consumption system with 
conventional metering, the City chose to install PPMs 
throughout Soweto and other townships. Conventional 
meters supply water on credit. Prepayment meters, 
however, have an automatic disconnection function 
that physically restricts water consumption in poor 
households to the obligatory FBW allocation, unless 
the household purchases additional water in the form 
of water credit vouchers. Calling the programme 
Operation Gcin’amanzi, meaning ‘conserve water’ in 
isiZulu, the City chose the poorest suburb of Soweto, 
Phiri, as the pilot project for the roll-out of prepayment 
meters.
The City’s water services provider, Johannesburg 
Water (Pty) Ltd, began the bulk infrastructure 
construction work for the installation of PPMs in 
Phiri on 11 August 2003, and individual household 
prepayment meters were installed starting in February 
2004. Initially, the only choice given to households 
was between a prepayment meter and total 
water disconnection. Households that rejected the 
prepayment meters had to suffer for months without 
any on-site access to water until they capitulated and 
accepted prepayment meters. Later on, households 
that refused prepayment meters were given an 
outside tap (standpipe), with explicit instructions not to 
connect a hose to the tap (the punishment for violating 
these terms being compulsory PPM installation). For 
these households, a standpipe represented a major 
regressive measure as, for example, they now had to 
collect water in a bucket to flush the toilet and wash 
the dishes.
For the households with prepayment meters, access 
to water was similarly restricted. With an average 
of 13 or more people living on each property, 
the standard FBW allocation (of six kilolitres per 
household per month, providing each person in a 
household of eight with 25 litres per day) was grossly 
insufficient to meet everyone’s basic sanitary needs. 
For those who exhausted their FBW supply before 
the end of the month, failure to purchase additional 
water credit resulted in an automatic and immediate 
disconnection of water supply. This meant no water 
for those who could not afford additional water until 
the next month’s FBW allocation.
The High Court case and judgment
Responding to the hardships and infringements of 
basic rights associated with the imposition of PPMs, 
in mid-2004, the residents of Phiri decided to build 
a legal case against the City. With the support of 
social movements – the Anti-Privatisation Forum and 
the Coalition Against Water Privatisation – and the 
assistance of the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) 
and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), 
the application was launched in the Johannesburg 
High Court on 12 July 2006. (The two years it took 
to initiate the litigation testifies to how difficult it is to 
mount socio-economic rights cases.)
The application was brought by five residents of 
Phiri, on behalf of themselves, all similarly positioned 
residents of Phiri and everyone in the public interest. 
The applicants were initially represented by FXI, but 
CALS took over as their attorneys from March 2007. 
The respondents were the City of Johannesburg, 
Johannesburg Water and the Minister of Water 
Affairs and Forestry. The Centre on Housing Rights 
and Evictions (COHRE), a Geneva-based international 
organisation focusing on housing and water rights, 
intervened as amicus curiae to raise relevant issues 
of international and comparative law.
The applicants challenged the sufficiency of 
the City’s FBW policy, arguing that this policy was 
inconsistent with section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution 
of South Africa (Constitution), which recognises 
the right of everyone to sufficient water. They also 
challenged the legality of PPMs in terms of the City’s 
water services by-laws and the Water Services 
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Before their supply is cut off, they are not only afforded rea-
sonable opportunity to settle the arrears, but are afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to make representation concerning 
the arrears and the settlement thereof. The applicants, the 
residents of Phiri, a poor and predominantly a Black area, 
are denied this right. This is not only unreasonable, unfair 
and inequitable, it is also discriminatory 
solely on the basis of colour (para 94).
The Court also held that the 
introduction of PPMs exclusively 
in an impoverished historically 
black area and not in historically 
rich white areas was based on 
an invidious stereotype that poor, 
black consumers were generally 
defaulters while rich consumers 
were reliable debtors. As the 
Judge observed, ‘Bad debt is a 
human problem, not a racial problem.’ The targeting 
of historically black geographical areas for the 
introduction of PPMs also constituted indirect racial 
discrimination (paras 154–155). Finally, the Judge 
held that PPMs had the effect of arbitrarily limiting 
access to water by the applicants. It also placed a 
disproportionate burden on poor black women who, 
in a patriarchal society such as ours, bore the brunt 
of household chores and care-giving responsibilities 
(para 179).
The Supreme Court of Appeal judgment
Unsurprisingly, the City, Johannesburg Water and 
the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry appealed 
against the entire High Court judgment. The appeal 
was heard before five judges of the SCA on 23–25 
February 2009. On 25 March 2009, Judge Piet 
Streicher handed down a unanimous judgment of the 
SCA. In the main, the judgment upheld the appeal, 
but it made a number of orders which affirmed some 
aspects of the residents’ case.
Despite the fact that the appeal was allowed, the 
SCA found in favour of the respondents (the residents 
of Phiri) in relation to the free water policy by the 
City and the introduction of PPMs.
The ‘direct reliance’ rule
The SCA dismissed the appellants’ argument that the 
residents of Phiri could not rely directly on their water 
rights as protected in section 27 of the Constitution, 
which guarantees everyone the right of access to 
sufficient water (the ’direct reliance’ rule). Rather, the 
Act 108 of 1997. In addition, they argued that by 
targeting poor residents (who also happened to be 
black) for the rollout of PPMs, the City had violated 
section 9(3) of the Constitution, which prohibits unfair 
discrimination. The applicants 
asked the City to provide them 
and al l  s imi larly positioned 
residents of Phiri with 50 litres of 
FBW per person per day and the 
option of the conventional meters 
provided to the wealthier, mostly 
white, residents of Johannesburg.
The application was heard in the 
High Court (3–5 December 2007) 
and judgment was handed down 
on 30 April 2008. In a landmark 
judgment (discussed by Khalfan 
and Conteh, 2008: 12–15), Judge Moroa Tsoka ruled 
in favour of the applicants, holding that the City’s 
imposition of PPMs was unlawful and unconstitutional. 
He ordered the City to provide the applicants and 
all similarly positioned residents of Phiri with 50 litres 
of free water per person per day and the option of 
a conventional metered water supply at the City’s 
cost. The court accepted the expert evidence of 
Peter Gleick, a highly regarded international expert 
on water rights, that 50 litres per person was the 
minimum quantum of water needed by Phiri residents 
to meet their basic needs, to avoid threats to their 
health and to live in dignity. It further held that it was 
‘uncontested that the respondents [had] the financial 
resources’ to increase the FBW allocation. In these 
circumstances, it was unreasonable for the City to 
limit its FBW allocation to 25 litres per person per 
day when it was capable of providing 50 litres per 
person ‘without straining its capacity on water and 
its financial resources’ (para 181).
The rollout of PPMs only in predominantly black 
residential areas was also found to contravene 
the constitutional right to equality. As Judge Tsoka 
observed:
The prepayment meters discriminate between the applicants 
and other residents within the municipality of the City. While 
other residents of the City, for example Sandton, get water 
on credit from the respondents, the applicants do not. If the 
residents of Sandton, a wealthy and formerly white area, 
served by the respondents, fell in arrears with their water 
bills, they are entitled to notices … before their water supply 
is cut off. Moreover, they are given an opportunity to make 
arrangements with the respondents to settle their arrears. 
The High Court accepted 
expert evidence that 50 
litres per person per day 
was the basic needed 
to meet basic needs, to 
avoid threats to health 
and to live in dignity.
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The critical question 
was whether the City’s 
decision to provide 
no more than the 
national minimum 
was consistent with 
its constitutional 
obligations to take 
reasonable measures 
to ensure that everyone 
has access to sufficient 
water.
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SCA found that the residents of Phiri were not obliged 
to ground their claim exclusively in terms of the Water 
Services Act and the National Standards Regulations 
promulgated in terms of the Act.
The SCA ruled that such measures, taken to give 
effect to section 27, were not intended ‘to cover the 
field and to deprive anyone of [their] right to rely on 
the provisions of s 27(1)’ (para 13).
We are of the view that the SCA’s approach is sound, 
as section 27(2) clearly envisages that both legislative 
and ‘other measures’ must be taken to achieve the 
realisation of the various rights in 
section 27(1). Thus, challenges to 
water policies cannot be based on 
existing legislation, as this would 
place a constitutional straitjacket 
on litigants seeking to challenge 
the adequacy of existing legal and 
policy measures which impact on 
the realisation of socio-economic 
rights. In any event, it is clear that 
the Act and the regulations were 
intended to provide a minimum 
national standard of 25 litres per 
person per day. It was therefore 
important to answer the critical 
question of whether the decision of 
the City of Johannesburg to provide 
no more than this national minimum 
was consistent with its constitutional obligations to 
take reasonable measures to ensure that everyone 
has access to ‘sufficient water’ (section 27(1)(b) read 
with (2)).
The FBW water policy
The SCA considered section 3 of the Water Services 
Act along with regulation 3(b) of the National 
Standards Regulations as measures to give effect to 
the constitutional right of everyone to have access to 
‘sufficient’ water. It held that the 25 litres per person 
per day provided for in regulation 3(b) constituted 
‘the minimum that may constitute sufficient water’ 
(para 14). However, as the circumstances of different 
communities differed, with some having access to 
waterborne sanitation and others only to pit latrines, it 
was incumbent on the City and other local authorities 
to consider what would constitute a sufficient supply 
in the light of such differing particular contexts.
In evaluating what would constitute a sufficient 
water supply, the Court endorsed three interrelated 
standards concerning life, health and dignity 
(para 17). It found support for these standards in 
international law, particularly the influential General 
Comment 15 adopted in 2002 by the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) (UN 
doc E/C.12/2002/11). The Court further held that 
assessing the quantity of water needed for a dignified 
existence required a context-sensitive evaluation that 
took into account, for example, whether people 
needed additional water because 
they relied on flush toilets (such as 
the Phiri residents). It found that 
the 25 litres standard could not 
have taken into account the water 
needs of communities relying on 
waterborne sanitation (para 18).
The Cour t  proceeded to 
consider the quantity of water which 
would meet the abovementioned 
standards of sufficiency in respect 
of the Phiri residents. It did so by 
referring to the evidence of two 
experts, Peter Gleick and Ian 
Palmer, on behalf of the residents 
and the City, respectively. Where 
there was a discrepancy in the 
evidence of the experts, it tended 
to rely on the evidence of Palmer for the respondents. 
Taking into account the quantity of water required 
for various household needs such as drinking, food 
preparation, bathing and toilet flushing, the Court 
held that 42 litres of water per person per day would 
constitute sufficient water for the Phiri residents in 
terms of section 27(1) of the Constitution (para 24).
The next major issue considered by the Court 
was whether the City was obliged to provide 42 
litres (or a lesser quantity of water) free of charge. 
The City contended that there was nothing in the 
Water Services Act or regulations that obliged them 
to provide ‘free’ water. In interpreting the phrase, 
‘access to’, in section 27(1)(b), the Court endorsed the 
CESCR’s stipulation that ‘access to water entails both 
physical and financial access’ (General Comment 15, 
para 12(c)). In other words, water should be affordable 
for all ‘and must be accessible to all including the most 
vulnerable or marginalized sections of the population, 
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in law and in fact’ (para 28). The contention that 
the City was not obliged to provide at least some 
quantity of water free of charge was rejected on 
the basis of the Court’s interpretation of the Act, the 
FBW policy of the government and the City, and the 
obligation to ensure that water was economically 
accessible in terms of section 27(1) of the Constitution. 
In determining the extent of the obligation to provide 
water free to people living in poverty, the SCA stated 
that the key criterion was what would be reasonable, 
taking into account the City’s available resources and 
other competing claims.
The Court considered the fact that the City had 
various other claims on its budget. It concluded, 
however, that the City’s decision to provide only six 
kilolitres of water per household (or 25 litres per 
person per day) was ‘materially influenced by an error 
of law’ and fell to be set aside on that basis (para 
38). Essentially, the City had failed to appreciate that 
it had both statutory and constitutional obligations 
to provide a sufficient amount of water, including, 
reasonable provision of free water for those who 
could not afford to pay for it.
Having set aside the City’s FBW policy, the Court 
ordered the City to formulate a revised water policy 
‘in the light of the finding that it is constitutionally 
obliged to grant each Phiri resident who cannot 
afford to pay for water access to 42 litres of water 
per day free in so far as it can reasonably be done 
having regard to its available resources and other 
relevant considerations’ (para 43). As an incentive to 
the City to adopt a revised free water policy as soon 
as possible, and to cater for those in dire need of 
water, the City was required to provide each account 
holder in Phiri who is registered with it as an indigent 
with 42 litres of free water per day per household 
member. 
There are certain positive features of the Court’s 
reasoning in relation to this aspect. These include its 
willingness to engage with the substantive interests 
and values that affect water as a human right, and 
to articulate normative standards against which the 
sufficiency of the water supply to an impoverished 
community must be measured. The Court was also 
unambiguous in affirming that the right of ‘access 
to’ water was not equivalent to access through 
exclusively commercial mechanisms. It included a 
constitutional obligation to ensure that water is 
economically accessible to the poor, including an 
obligation to supply free water to meet basic needs. 
The serious consideration which the Court gave to 
leading international law standards on water rights 
in interpreting section 27 of the Constitution and 
its engagement with expert evidence on the water 
needs of the Phiri community are also positive features 
of the judgment.
More problematic is the reduction of 50 litres 
of water to 42 litres on the basis of preferring 
Palmer’s evidence in cases where his figures diverged 
from those of Gleick. A generous and substantive 
interpretation of the evidence regarding the relevant 
water needs would have been preferable in the light 
of the vital interests protected by the right to water 
– particularly in an impoverished community such as 
Phiri, with a high HIV/AIDS prevalence.
Furthermore, there are difficulties with the Court’s 
construction of section 27 of the Constitution read 
as a whole. Section 27(1)(b) defines the full scope 
of the right to which ‘everyone’ is entitled. Section 
27(2) describes the nature of the state’s obligations 
in achieving the realisation of this right. The state 
must take ‘reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resource, to achieve the progressive 
realisation’ of this right. An approach that implies that 
42 litres of water per person per day represents the 
full extent of the right guaranteed in section 27(1)(b) 
(ie a ceiling), would be unduly limiting of the scope of 
the right and would also fail to take into account the 
diversity of water needs of differently placed groups 
and communities.
A better interpretation is that 50 litres (or 42 litres, if 
the SCA’s assessment is accepted) of water per person 
per day is what currently constitutes a reasonable 
measure in terms of section 27(2). However, relevant 
organs of state remain under an obligation to take 
reasonable measures towards the full realisation of 
the right as defined in section 27(1)(b). The assessment 
of the reasonableness of the measures adopted by 
the state at a particular juncture should take into 
account the lived realities of poor communities and 
the impact of a lack of water on their lives, and the 
implications of a lack of water for women and the 
ability of poor communities to participate fully in the 
activities of society. Moreover, this assessment cannot 
occur without a prior normative understanding being 
developed of the right to sufficient water and the 
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imposition and continued application of PPMs in 
impoverished black communities and the credit supply 
option offered to communities in historically white 
areas constituted a breach of equality rights.
The remedy
The SCA starts off promisingly by reinforcing the 
principle laid down by the Constitutional Court in 
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 
786 (CC) that ‘an appropriate remedy must mean an 
effective remedy’, and that where an ‘infringement 
of an entrenched right has occurred, it must be 
effectively vindicated’ (paras 69 and 44). However, 
in fact, the SCA provides neither an effective remedy 
nor a vindication of the infringed rights.
On the issue of FBW, the SCA’s interim order is 
exclusionary, restricting the allocation of the 42 litre 
amount to Phiri residents on the City’s indigency 
register, despite having found a long-standing 
violation of the right to water. In addition, the 
evidence presented by the residents to the SCA 
was that the indigency register was woefully under-
representative of the number of formally qualifying 
indigent households. Moreover, as highlighted in the 
record, the City’s indigency register captures only 
each account holder, and not the number of people 
living in a household or on a property. This means 
that there is no way for the interim order to achieve 
the objective of providing ‘each account holder in 
Phiri who is registered … as an indigent with 42 litres 
of free water per day per member of his or her 
household’ (para 62(4)).
The SCA’s order in respect of PPMs is even less 
effective and more problematic. Having found that 
the installation of PPMs in Phiri was unlawful, the 
SCA ruled that obliging the City to remove them 
was an inappropriate remedy, and that a better 
remedy, which would safeguard residents who 
genuinely preferred PPMs, was to suspend the order 
of invalidity for a period of two years to enable the 
City to legalise the use of PPMs. Here, the judgment 
is not only wrong in its inference that the High Court 
ordered the removal of PPMs (it did not), but it is also 
wrong in its legal logic. Having found that the City 
had acted unlawfully in installing PPMs in Phiri, the 
SCA ought to have upheld the High Court order, 
which obliged the City to provide residents of Phiri 
with the option of a conventional water meter at the 
City’s cost. This remedy would have provided effective 
interaction between the right to equality and the need 
for ecologically sustainable development and use of 
natural resources. It is only against this normative and 
contextual background that a proper judgment can 
be made on whether a reliance by organs of state on 
resource constraints can be deemed reasonable.
The lawfulness of the PPMs
Regarding PPMs, the SCA held that the City’s Water 
Services By-Laws of 21 May 2004 did not authorise 
the installation of a PPM other than as a penalty for 
breaching the conditions of service of a standpipe. 
Consequently, the installation of PPMs in Phiri was 
found to be ultra vires and unlawful (paras 57 and 
58).
The SCA rejected the City’s argument that the cutting 
off of water services by a prepayment meter when 
the credit ran out did not constitute a discontinuation 
of services (para 55). It further held that
procedures for the limitation or discontinuation of water 
services must be fair and equitable, provide for reasonable 
notice of intention to limit or discontinue the services and for 
an opportunity to make representations. They may not result 
in a person being denied access to basic water services for 
non-payment, where that person proves to the satisfaction 
of the relevant water services authority that he or she is 
unable to pay for basic services (para 54).
In their arguments in the SCA, the residents highlighted 
the unlawfulness of both the installation of PPMs 
and the functioning of PPMs. Although the SCA 
correctly ruled that the PPM installation was unlawful, 
the judgment failed to deal meaningfully with the 
issue of the inherent unlawfulness of PPMs, such 
as their automatic disconnection without satisfying 
the procedural requirements of reasonable notice 
and opportunity to make representation prior to 
disconnection.
While the judgment briefly mentioned the legal 
requirements for fair and equitable procedures for 
the discontinuation of water supply (located in section 
4(3) of the Water Services Act), the SCA did not go 
on to decide whether PPM functioning violated these 
requirements. Nor did the SCA base its order on 
any finding in this regard. The neglect of this critical 
component of the case against PPMs contributed to 
the ineffective remedy on the issue of PPMs, which 
we discuss next.
Moreover, in contrast with the High Court 
judgment, the SCA’s judgment was also notable 
for not dealing at all with the argument that the 
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At the time of writing, the applicants had applied 
for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court against 
the SCA judgment. The appeal raises some of the 
shortcomings in the SCA decision discussed above.
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relief to residents opposed to PPMs, while allowing 
residents who preferred PPMs to retain them.
Finally, possibly because the SCA did not deal 
with the arguments about the inherently unlawful 
functioning of PPMs, the order is lamentably weak in 
its prescriptions of the ‘steps’ the City should take to 
legalise the use of prepayment meters In the context 
of the Water Services Act’s procedural requirements, 
it is doubtful that any simple amendment of the City’s 
by-laws to allow for the installation of PPMs in the 
first instance would render PPMs lawful, as these 
by-laws would not operate retrospectively. As things 
stand, even if the City were to merely amend the by-
laws as advised by the SCA, it would still be open 
to Phiri residents to raise the issue of the inherent 
unlawfulness of PPMs.
Conclusion
Despite promising aspects, the SCA’s judgment 
ultimately fails to provide normative clarity in 
interpreting the right of access to sufficient water 
and the nature of the obligations it imposes on water 
services providers. It also falls short of its stated 
intention to provide an effective remedy for the 
constitutional infringements caused by FBW supply 
and the use of PPMs.
  
     
 
      
     
 
       
      
     
     
       
        
       
  
 
        
       
       
           
        
        
       
      
